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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
in New York prior to the enactment of the N. I. L.. nor is it the rule
in England. The rule that existed in this state, and that exists in
England, was that a person signing for, or on behalf of, a principal was
not liable on the instrument, notwithstanding he had no authority to
bind his principal. There was an implied warranty on his part that he
possessed the requisite authority, and if he did not. he became liable
upon such warranty for the .lamages resulting from the breach.
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It is submitted that the rule as stated in the affirming opinion is
the sounder, inasmuch as the agent when he signs without authority is
in reality not an agent but a principal acting in his own behalf, deriving
the benefits of his act, and should, therefore, be primarily liable on the
instrument itself and not incidentally on a warranty of authority.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE-STATUTE
OF LiMITATIONS.-In an action brought in a superior court of Wash-
ington, a judgment was -rendered against McDonald on June 24, 1918,
in favor of Dart. In February, 1924, Dart assigned this judgment to
Roche. In March, McDonald being then temporarily employed in
Oregon, Roche brought suit against him upon the judgment in a circuit
court of that State. He was personally served with a summons.
appeared and demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was overruled
and subsequently, in October, 1924, more than six years after the
rendition of the Washington judgment, judgment was rendered against
him in default of answer for the amount of the original judgment with
interest.
Shortly thereafter Roche brought this suit against McDonald, upon
the Oregon judgment, in the superior court of Washington. McDonald
answered denying the validity of the Oregon judgment under a Wash-
ington statute which provided that after six years from the rendition
of any judgment it should cease to be a charge against the judgment
debtor, and no suit should be had extending its duration or continuing
it in force beyond such six years.1 In reply Roche set up and relied
on the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.2 The superior
court entered judgment for defendant and this was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Washington.' Held, judgment reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings. Roche v. McDonald. 48 Sup. C. 142
(U. S. 1928).
It is settled that the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
requires that the judgment of a State Court having jurisdiction of the
Ryan v. Hebert, 46 R. I. 47; 124 Ati. 657 (1924); Pain v. Holtcamp, 10
Fed. (2d) 443 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Austin Nichols & Co. v. Gross. 98 Conn.
782, 120 Atl. 596 (1923).
4 Haupt v. Vint, 68 W. Va. 657 (1911) ; White v. Madison, 26 N. Y. 117
(1862); Dusenbury v. Ellis, 3 Johns. Cas. 70 (1802) ; White v. Skinner, 13
Johns. 307 (1816); Feeter v. Heath, 11 Wendell, 477 (1833) ; Collen v. Wright-
40 Eng. L. & Eq. 182.
1 Rem. Comp. Stat. Wash. §§ 459, 460.
2 U. S. Const. Art. 4 § 1.
3 136 Wash. 322, 239 Pac. 1015, 44 A. L. R. 444 (1925).
RECEN T DECISIONS
parties and the subject matter in suit shall be given in the courts of
every other State the same credit, validity and effect which it has in the
State where it was rendered, and be equally conclusive upon the merits.'
This is likewise true where a judgment in one State is based upon a
cause of action which arose in the State in which it is sought to be
enforced; and the judgment, if valid where rendered, must be enforced
in such other state though repugnant to its own statutesYr
In Fauntleroy v. Lur 8 the original cause of action arose in Mississippi
out of a gambling contract in cotton futures. Such contracts were by
statute in that State unenforceable. Suit was, however, instituted in
Missouri, the defendant being temporarily there and a judgment for the
plaintiff was recovered. When suit was brought in Mississippi on the
Missouri judgment, the defendant had judgment which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court of Mississippi. This decision was reversed in
the United States Supreme Court where the rule which is controlling was
reiterated. "A judgment is conclusive as to all the media concludendi,
and it needs no authority to show that it cannot be impeached in or out
of the State by showing that it was based upon a mistake of law."
In the instant case the Oregon judgment, being valid and conclusive
between the parties in that State, was equally conclusive in the Courts
of Washington and under the full faith and credit clause should have
been enforced by them. The defendant could not avail himself of the
obvious error of the Oregon court in its interpretation of the Washington
statute of limitations.
CORPORATIONs-DISREGARD OF CORPORATE FIcTIoN-LIcENSING OF
INSURANCE AGENTS.-The Supreme Court of Ohio has lately contributed
a most interesting adjunct to that steadily expanding body of law centred
about the disregard of the corporate fiction. An Ohio corporation
organized in 1916 for the purpose of acting as local agent for fire
insurance companies, *sought a license for the conduct of its business for
the fiscal year ending February, 1928 All formal statutory prerequisites
had been met. The State Superintendent of Insurance denied the appli-
cation, on the ground that "no person may be licensed to act as an
insurance agent unless a resident of this state."' It appeared that a
controlling interest in the Ohio corporation was owned by a foreign
corporation extensively engaged in insurance brokerage and. at the
time, the holler of an Ohio foreign insurance broker's license.
The domestic corporation resorted to mandamus, setting forth in its
petition the above facts and the avowed ground of the superintendent's
refusal. Respondent demurred. Held, demurrer sustained. State ex
rel. Marsh & McLennan Co. v. Safford, State Superintendent of Insur-
ance. 159 N. E. 829 (Ohio, Dec. 28, 1927).
4Hampton v. McConnel, 3 Wheat. 234. 4 L. Ed. 378 (1818); Hancock
National Bank v. Furnum, 176 U. S. 640. 20 S. Ct. 506, 44 L. Ed. 619 (1899).
5 Fauntleroy v. Luri, 210 U. S. 231, 28 S. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039 (1907):
Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U. S. 411. 40 S. Ct. 371, 64 L. Ed. 683 (1910).
6 Supra note S.
IOhio General Code § 644.
